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Abstract: This paper investigates the development and adoption of governance modes in 
the field of human biotechnology. As the field of human biotechnology is relatively new, 
voluntary professional self-regulation constituted the initial governing mode. In the 
meantime, with the exception of Ireland, all Western European countries have moved 
towards greater state intervention. Nevertheless they have done so in contrasting ways and 
the resulting governance modes for assisted reproductive technology (ART) and 
embryonic stem-cell research vary greatly. Instead of imposing their steering capacity in a 
‘top-down’ fashion, governments have taken pre-existing self-regulatory arrangements in 
the field into account and built up governance mechanisms in conjunction with private 
actors and pre-existing modes of private governance. Our analysis demonstrates that the 
form and content of the initial self-regulation explain why the self-steering capacity of the 
medical profession was largely or at least partially preserved through hybrid governance 
systems in Britain and in Germany, while in France the self-regulation was entirely 
replaced by governmental intervention. 
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This paper investigates how governance arrangements build up over time for the novel 
policy issue of human biotechnology. In contrast to established policy issues, at the outset, 
novel policy issues are largely unstructured and modes of governance are undetermined. 
Our analysis reveals how the continuous and contentious process of structuring a new 
policy problem is intimately intertwined with the establishment of governance 
arrangements (Capano, Rayner and Zito 2012). Studying the emergence of systems of 
governance for novel policy issue provides us to a certain extent with close to “laboratory-
like” conditions (Migone and Howlett 2009) as all the countries studied face the same 
challenge of answering the question of why and how to address the risks and the 
uncertainties that new technological developments in human biotechnology bear.  
Starting with in vitro fertilization (IVF) at the end of the 1970s, a number of major 
biotechnological breakthroughs have set the pace for rapid and far-reaching developments 
in human biotechnology. IVF has enabled the dissociation of reproduction, and opened up 
avenues for the development of a number of cutting-edge techniques such as genetic 
diagnosis and screening, cloning, and embryonic stem cell research. Advances in human 
biotechnology have provided effective treatment against infertility, offered great promise 
for the treatment of life-threatening diseases such diabetes and Parkinson's disease, and 
permitted the extension of organ transplants. This series of technological innovations has 
shed light on the field of human biotechnology as a whole, and attracted increasing public 
attention. While one of the IVF pioneers has recently been awarded the Nobel prize in 
Physiology or Medicine, serious concern has grown among the public regarding the 
potential health risks and ethical issues raised by the development of technologies that 
enable the manipulation of human embryo. 
Governing human biotechnology presents states with a complex policy issue that 
requires balancing a series of contrasting, and potentially conflicting interests and policy 
goals (Weimer 2010; Salter and Frewer 2009): protection of the public, promotion of 
scientific and economic development. Determining how to protect society from potential 
medical and social abuses while encouraging technological development and stimulating 
the economic competitiveness by funding stem cells research constitutes one paradigmatic 
case of an intractable policy problem (Hisschemöller and Hoppe 1995; Schön and Rein 
1995). Hence, there is no certainty on the policy means that have to be developed as well 
as no a priori consensus on the moral and social values that the policy should seek to 
pursue. 
Since the early stages in the development of human biotechnology, the differences 
in governance modes across Western Europe intrigued and puzzled comparative public 
policy scholars. Given the economic and scientific potential of human biotechnology and 
the increased international competition in R&D activities (National Science Board 20122; 
Ernest & Young 2011), purely economic and interest-driven accounts of policy trajectory 
would predict minimal state intervention combined with strong promotional activities 
(Banchoff 2005: 204; Tiberghien 2009). Our case studies of France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom show that instead of staying out of the field, governments across Western 
Europe have actually taken an active part in building up governance arrangements. 
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However, the resulting governance modes for assisted reproductive technology (ART) and 
embryonic stem-cell research vary greatly in their focus, form, aim and tools. France has 
fully taken over self-regulation and established traditional “command and control” 
governance mode. Germany has developed a hybrid mode that combines direct state 
regulation and self-regulation of the medical community, whereas Great Britain has 
mostly delegated regulatory power to an independent body. From a comparative 
perspective, the question arises as to how and why different modes of governance have 
been developed to respond to a similar intractable policy problem. 
Our paper investigates how governance modes are initially developed and evolve 
over time into different forms of hybrid arrangements that combine direct government 
instruments and private governance tools. Our comparative case studies reveal that the 
state has progressively played a more pivotal role in the field over time. From being a 
external and passive observer of initial self-governance arrangements, the state has 
progressively become a primary player in governing the field of human biotechnology, 
and its responsibility and steering capacity has strengthened over time. Governments, 
however, instead of imposing their steering capacity in ‘top-down’ fashion, have taken 
pre-existing self-regulatory arrangements in the field into account and built up governance 
mechanisms in conjunction with private actors and pre-existing modes of private 
governance. The initial mode of regulation consisted of self-regulation developed by 
physicians’ organizations (Rothmayr 2003, Engeli 2009; Rothmayr et al. 2004). The 
medical profession was directly confronted with the rapid development of the human 
biotechnology field and was often the first to address the concerns of their members and to 
issue guidelines or to adapt existing standards of conduct. 
Our case studies show that the interaction of organizational factors with policy-
process specific variables explains the variation in governance arrangements. On the one 
hand, comprehensive and well-respected voluntary self-regulation strengthens the medical 
community’s position as experts and its credibility as a reliable partner of the state in 
building up governance arrangements. On the other hand, the cohesion of policy 
preferences within the medical community limits the success of issue-expansion strategies 
of other actors with competing policy preferences, such as religious actors who have 
attempted to mobilize against human biotechnology and against self-governance as the 
predominant governance mode. 
 
HUMAN BIOTECHNOLOGY AS AN INTRACTABLE POLICY PROBLEM 
 
The rapid pace of the development of human biotechnology  
The invention of IVF in 1978 in the United Kingdom has largely diffused worldwide and 
has been substantially improved since 1992 with the development of additional ART 
techniques increasing the success rate in cases of male infertility. Dramatically expending 
the range of treatments for infertility, ART techniques encountered high demand and ART 
medical centers have proliferated at a rapid pace. For instance, nowadays, common ART 
treatments lead, in the United States, to the birth of 1% of all the infants born every year 
and about 12% of women of childbearing age have used an infertility service3. 
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While the first IVF births have been celebrated in the media as a major scientific 
achievement in country after country, public opinion in continental Europe soon reflected 
broad concern, ranging from the technological manipulation of the reproduction process to 
women's exposure to an excessive level of medical risk. The concerns about the social 
implications of biotechnology have sharply increased with the development of in vitro 
genetic screening in 1990 and the development of embryonic stem cell research and 
therapeutic cloning in subsequent years. While the scientific community has remained 
cautious about future treatment possibilities (see for instance Lovell-Badge 2001), the 
development of stem cell research and therapeutic cloning has raised hopes about future 
major advances for cell-based therapies to cure life-threatening diseases such as diabetes 
or Huntington's disease and transplant possibilities.4 There has also been increased public 
concern about potential scientific misuses and fears of eugenics practices that are still 
strongly associated among publics with the Nazi regime (Jasanoff 2005). At the same 
time, the biotechnology sector has been growing rapidly in the last decades (Ernst 
&Young 2006), even though from late 2008 onward the financial crisis considerably 
slowed down R&D investments in the sector (Ernst&Young 2013: 23f). If reproductive 
and regenerative medicines have represented so far only a small share of the 
biotechnology sector, the therapeutic promises have resulted in increasing competition 
around the globe. In Asia, several governments such as India, Singapore or South Korea 
have targeted stem cell research as a valuable competitive niche in the biotechnology 
sector and have consequently invested funding (Ernst & Young 2006, 2010) while the EU, 
various European countries such as the UK, and some American states, have also heavily 
invested in stem cell research and regenerative medicine.5 
 
The absence of international norms 
While biotechnology development and competition is a global process, so far no 
international norms have been established with the relative exception of the reproductive 
cloning ban in the European Union. In 1997 and 2005 divisions among United Nation’s 
member states have resulted in non-binding declarations only calling upon governments to 
outlaw human cloning. At the beginning of the 2000s, UNESCO launched the drafting of 
an international convention against human cloning. While a fair number of countries, 
including the Bush administration, strongly supported the adoption of international norms 
on human biotechnology, other countries such as France, Belgium and the United 
Kingdom were in favor of leaving member states to decide whether cloning for research 
purposes should be permitted6. This split in positions let to aborting attempts to adopt 
regulations and the sole outcome was a non-binding declaration in 2005. Since then, the 
debate has not been re-opened.  
At the European level, efforts toward promoting common norms regarding human 
biotechnology have encountered a similar fate until recently. Some major European 
countries such as the United Kingdom, Belgium, France and the Netherlands have not 
ratified the 1997 European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine.7 In the 2000s, 
similar major divergences among Member States of the European Union have prevented 
the elaboration of binding norms on cloning.8 It is only since the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty in 2009 that reproductive human cloning has been prohibited through the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
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Human Biotechnology as an Intractable Policy Problem 
The absence of comprehensive international norms on biotechnology has left national 
governments with a serious dilemma about how best to govern human biotechnology. 
Value-driven issues in the biotechnology sector present governments with complex policy 
challenges. Their multi-dimensional characteristics require balancing contrasted, and often 
antagonistic, interests and policy goals (Salter and Frewer 2009): protecting the public, 
fostering technology and promoting economic development. Determining how best 
responding to public concerns about the social implications of human biotechnology, 
while not impeding upon technological and economic development, constitutes one 
paradigmatic case of an intractable policy problem (Hisschemöller and Hoppe 1995; 
Schön and Rein 1995). Hisschemöller and Hoppe 1995 (43-45; see also Hisschemöller 
1993 and Hoppe 1989) categorize four types of policy problems that vary in the degree of 
consensus on policy goals to be implemented and the certainty over the policy instruments 
to be adopted. In other terms, a policy problem is not easy or hard to solve per se. Its 
degree of complexity will derive from the existence and structure of the political conflict. 
Policy solutions on structured problems are drawn from a broad consensus over the policy 
aims and a shared knowledge about the means to achieve these aims. Resolving 
moderately structured problems is somewhat harder due to either the lack of consensual 
goals (ends-oriented problem resolution) or the lack of well-defined instruments (means-
oriented problem resolution). Nevertheless, confidence in the broadly shared consensus 
over the other dimension provides governments with the means to resolve the problem. 
Agreement over the means, or alternatively over the ends, offers a minimal shared base on 
which the overall consensus may be reached through negotiation (Hisschenmoller and 
Hoppe 1995). Finally, unstructured problems pose a series of complex challenges for 
government. The high degree of conflict over both goals and means leaves government 
with intractable problems to solve. As the following analysis reveals, we argue that facing 
such a type of novel, intractable policy problem, governments have relied on the pre-
existing self-governance modes in the field of human biotechnology to build new, hybrid 
modes of governance that would provide a measure of agreement on the goals to be 
pursued and the means to achieve them. 
 
 
BUILDING UP GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS ON INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS: THE 
INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE STATE AND PRIVATE ACTORS 
 
The development of alternative governance arrangements has attracted the attention of 
policy scholars towards self-governance modes. Policy research has shown that several 
alternatives to the traditional “command and control” mode exist but the question as to 
why and under which conditions one specific mode of governance is selected over another 
has remained, so far, much debated in the literature. To tackle this challenge, this paper 
investigates the impact of self-regulation on the choice of governance mode in the field of 
human biotechnology. In order to do so, we first discuss the concept of self-regulation, and 
then spell out the conditions under which professional self-regulation impacts the 
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development of governance arrangements and formulate two hypotheses that we then test 
in the subsequent comparative analysis. 
 
The categorization of governance arrangements for human biotechnology 
Professional self-regulation - also called private regulation, voluntary regulation or self-
governance - can be approached from various perspectives. In policy studies, the policy 
instrument perspective has been traditionally adopted to study self-regulation with the goal 
of determining the best type of instrument for reaching policy goals (Dryzek 1983; 
Ingraham 1987; Linder and Peters 1984; Ingram and Schneider 1991). In this perspective, 
policy instruments are conceptualized as the tools to realize the goals set out by a policy, 
the means that political and administrative actors use to turn their policies into action and 
ultimately obtain the initially defined results (Howlett 1991). Self-regulation is thereby 
one type of policy instrument and is best characterized by a low degree of coercion and 
state intervention (Howlett et al. 2009). From a governance perspective, however, self-
regulation is conceived as part of a broader governance context that is “….characterized 
[…] by complex interdependencies and exchange relationships between public and private 
actors” (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002: 49). The extent to which non-governmental 
stakeholders participate in deciding procedures as well as establishing and enforcing 
norms varies across governance modes. To explain this variation, we categorize how and 
to what extent governance arrangements incorporate modes of self-regulation. 
Research has pointed out that simply dichotomizing government vs. governance - 
or “command and control” policy instruments vs. self-regulation instruments - is not 
workable. Rather, recent literature emphasizes the hybrid character of governance 
arrangements and stresses the continuous yet changing involvement of government in 
systems of governance (Capano et al. 2012). Indeed, along this line, there are various 
forms of self-regulatory arrangements where stakeholders share decisional power to 
various degrees with state or other actors (Ogus 1995: 99; Gunningham and Rees 1996: 
266). While the literature agrees on the fact that rule-makers and rule-takers are greatly 
overlapping in self-regulation - simple consultation thus does not qualify as self-regulation 
– there is some disagreement in the literature on the degree of overlap. For Levi-Faur 
(2011: 8) the key feature of self-regulation is the fact that the regulator and the regulatee 
are identical while in Weimer’s “private rulemaking” regime (2006: 569), rule-maker and 
rule-taker do not have necessarily to be identical as long as authority has been explicitly 
delegated to stakeholders to develop and enforce regulation. In contrast, Gunningham and 
Rees (1997: 364) focus their definition on non-delegated forms of self-regulation: “…the 
normative orders of private governments (such as corporations, schools, hospitals), and the 
normative orders of professional communities and business networks''. 
Given the strong self-regulatory tradition of the medical profession, we argue that 
self-regulation does not result only from explicit delegation. Physician’s self-regulation 
results from a long-term interaction between private and public actors and should not be 
taken as a spontaneous process detached from the state (Hassenteufel 1997). It is 
nevertheless this strong self-regulatory tradition that allows, in return, the medical 
profession to address any new emerging medical issues without explicit delegation from 
the state. Furthermore, self-regulation can also be the dominant mode of governance in 
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situations where political actors fail to adopt policies, i.e. because of fundamental value 
conflicts threatening governmental coalitions or potential electoral costs. In order to be 
able to analyze governance modes in the field of human biotechnology, our analysis 
therefore focuses on formalized forms of self-regulation - where actors have agreed upon 
specific norms or rules in an explicit way and follow some type of recognized procedure – 
but is not limited to the explicit delegation mode of self-regulation and includes self-
regulation without the intervention of the state. 
We define self-governance as the governance mode where the targeted 
stakeholders decide over the norms or the mechanisms of decision-making and 
implementation, or share this power with state actors or other actors within the policy 
network of actors. Such power can be explicitly delegated or not, but in both cases rule-
making is based on some type of recognized procedure in order to adopt formal rules. 
Such self-governance mode might also vary in terms of their reach, their “monopolistic 
power” (Ogus 1995: 100). In cases where self-regulatory norms are only adopted by some, 
but not all relevant stakeholders, there is the possibility of competing self-governance 
modes. National medical associations might be composed of various regional associations, 
and there are also specialized medical organizations. In addition, given the growing 
importance of the reproduction industry, there are standards or guidelines of practice at the 
clinical level, e.g. adopted by a specific group of reproductive clinics. Therefore, when 
investigating governance modes, we need to take into account the possibility of multiple 
self-governance arrangements that might influence policy-making processes. Accordingly, 
we categorize governance modes in terms of how strongly stakeholders are involved in 
rule-making into four different types that constitute a continuum. 
Voluntary self-regulation is characterized by full control over rule-making by the 
stakeholders without that power being explicitly delegated to them. As the human 
biotechnology field is relatively new, such voluntary self-regulation constituted what we 
call the initial governance mode, and preceded any state intervention (Engeli and 
Rothmayr 2012). 
Next we distinguish delegated self-regulation, where stakeholders also enjoy full 
control over rule-making, but where power has been expressly delegated to them. In 
delegated self-regulation mode, the substance of policy-making is delegated through a 
formal decision in form of a law, regulation etc. The power to self-regulate is thus 
recognized by the state and the stakeholders cannot choose whether to self-regulate but are 
obligated to do so. In contrast to voluntary self-regulation, the issue to be regulated has 
accessed the political agenda and resulted in the decision to delegate. 
In the case of partial delegated self-regulation, rule-making is shared between the 
state and stakeholders and the latter have only partial control over the substance of the 
regulations. This type of governance mode might take various forms. For example, while 
stakeholders may develop the norms to be applied, these norms or rules might have to be 
approved through another body, by the state bureaucracy or by an independent body (see 
Levi-Faur 2011). Alternatively, the state might specify in detail the procedures structuring 
the process of self-regulation, and impose certain conditions on how, when etc. the norms 
and rules have to be adopted. A third form of partial delegated self-regulation might 
consist of the state adopting regulations for certain issues, and leaving the regulation of 
others explicitly to stakeholders.  
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From these three forms of self-governance modes, we distinguish “command and 
control” mode – the traditional mode of government. In such a mode, stakeholders might 
be consulted or deploy various lobbying efforts, but they are not substantively involved in 
rule-making processes through delegation. The stakeholder’s expertise is mobilized 
through consultation, yet without sharing decisional power (see Weimer 2006). 
Western European countries have all moved from the initial mode of voluntary 
self-governance toward more state intervention into the regulation of the field, with the 
exception of Ireland. Our paper investigates how governance modes are initially 
developed and evolve over time into different forms of hybrid arrangements that mix 
direct government instruments and private governance tools. We argue that governments, 
instead of imposing their steering capacity in a ‘top-down’ fashion, have taken pre-
existing self-regulatory arrangements in the field into account and built up governance 
mechanisms in conjunction with private actors and pre-existing modes of private 
governance.  
The literature has addressed the phenomenon of combining private and public 
governance modes under the term of policy mix, instrument mix and also hybrid systems 
or organizations of service delivery mainly in the fields of environmental, regulatory and 
welfare policies (Howlett and Rayner 2007; Evers 2005; van der Heijden 2011). Following 
van der Heijden (2011), a hybrid aims at “combining the strengths of both sectors”, private 
and public, and are defined by the fact that “both public and private sector agencies 
operate in the same field” (van der Heijden 2011: 368). Such hybrid systems vary 
according to the importance of private and public sector involvement (van der Heijden 
2011: 370). In line with Evers (2005), we prefer, in this article, the term of hybrid 
governance to policy mix, because the concept of hybrid points to the fact that we are not 
simply looking at combinations of two types of policy instruments, but that we are 
interested in the emergence of “institutions that are shaped simultaneously by all three 
possible sectors, their values, and their steering mechanisms “, i.e. the market (private 
clinics), civil society (medical associations, interest groups) and the state (Evers 2005: 
738).  
 
The impact of self-governance on choice for governance mode 
Stakeholders often play an important role in policy-making processes because of their 
expertise, but also because they are indispensible partners for successful policy-
implementation. Their governance capacity, in terms of organizational structures and 
abilities, is hereby an important factor for explaining what form hybrid modes of 
governance might take, i.e. for explaining the importance self-governance mechanism 
within a specific governance arrangement (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002).  
We assume that medical associations want to preserve as much freedom for 
practicing human biotechnology as possible. This does not necessarily mean that they 
want no state intervention at all. The clarification of some legal parameters - for example 
pertaining to civil law issues (such as filiation) - are outside of their self-regulatory 
capacity, but are essential for the well functioning of the human biotechnology industry. 
Yet, previous research points out that medical associations want to preserve their 
autonomy in terms of medical practice, and this independently from their substantive 
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preferences for what to practice and how to practice human biotechnology (Rothmayr 
2003, Engeli 2009, Bleiklie et al. 2004). Given their strong self-regulatory tradition, but 
also their interest in preserving self-regulation, one strategy is to adopt voluntary self-
regulation early in the policy-making process. As pointed out above, we assume that such 
initial voluntary self-regulation might have an impact on subsequent policy-making 
processes. As we argue next, institutional characteristics of voluntary self-regulation for 
human biotechnology, namely their comprehensiveness and enforcement mechanisms, 
vary across countries. The variation in governance capacity (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002) 
might help us to better understand why self-regulation influences policy-making processes 
and the resulting systems of governance in some cases, but not in others. We thereby 
understand governance capacity not simply as an organizational attribute (Knill and 
Lehmkuhl 2002). In the case of the novel, and intractable policy issue of human 
biotechnology, to what extent medical actors succeed in influencing how the problem is 
structured and framed, constitutes a crucial factor for explaining the impact of self-
governance on the governance mode.  
Within policy studies, cognitive approaches assume that actors make sense of the 
world and policy questions by reducing complexity and focusing on certain aspects of a 
problem, while leaving others on the side. Voluntary self-regulation impacts the framing 
of human biotechnology. It reduces ‘problem pressure’ and influences the agenda-setting 
process. Voluntary self-regulation frames human biotechnology as primarily a medical 
issue instead of a moral problem. Through self-regulatory mechanisms, the medical 
profession shows the public that it is capable and willing to address the most urgent issues. 
Private actors demonstrate that they dispose of sufficient ‘governance capacity’ (Knill and 
Lehmkuhl 2002: 48) which depends on the “…extent to which organisations are able to 
influence, monitor, and sanction the behavior of their members…”. Governance capacity 
finds its expression not just in terms of enforcement capability, but also in terms of policy-
formulation, i.e. to strike standards or policies that address not just marginal issues related 
to human biotechnology, but address the major questions in a fairly comprehensive way. 
The demonstration of governance capacity strengthens the position of medical actors in 
the policy-making process in two ways. First of all, in contrast to other state or private 
actors, they dispose of concrete expertise and knowledge in regulating the issue. Second, 
they demonstrate their policy-making and enforcement capabilities and hence contribute to 
a favorable evaluation of their enforcement activities. This is of particular importance, as 
professional expertise has come under increasingly critical scrutiny over the last decades. 
Successful voluntary self-regulation strengthens their position as experts and their 
credibility as reliable partners in the regulatory process. Our first hypothesis, hence, 
postulates, that comprehensive and well-respected voluntary self-regulation of human 
biotechnology increases the likelihood of partial or fully delegated self-regulation.  
The second factor that we expect to have an important impact on regulatory 
courses and the development of governance mode pertains to the preferences of the 
medical profession itself. Research on biotechnology has shown that substantive 
preferences of medical associations do vary across countries (Rothmayr 2003, Engeli 
2009, Bleiklie et al. 2004). In some cases, medical associations opted for very stringent 
self-regulations, limiting what doctors could offer in terms of services, for example 
surrogacy or embryo donation; in other cases their self-regulation was fairly liberal aiming 
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at quality assurance. Furthermore, we cannot assume that the medical profession’s 
preference is for no state intervention at all. Human biotechnology raises a number of 
questions that might best be regulated by law (for example in terms of defining who the 
parents are in cases of gamete or embryo donation) and which go beyond the medical 
profession’s self-regulatory capacity. While we can assume that the medical associations 
want to preserve as much freedom to practice assisted reproduction as possible, they might 
at the same time welcome state regulations that facilitate the functioning of the assisted 
reproductive industry by clarifying a number of legal parameters. Furthermore, the 
medical profession is not necessarily a homogenous group and preferences for how far and 
how deeply the state should intervene in regulating human biotechnology varies not only 
across countries but also within the membership of individual associations. Dissent over 
the extent to which state should intervene in the field and over the degree of regulatory 
permissiveness may occur within the medical community. Such dissent weakens the 
lobbying capacity of the professional organizations and compromises its capacity to 
impact on policy choices (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002: 48). This is particularly the case for 
the field of human biotechnology, which involves the manipulation of human embryo. 
Cohesion in policy preferences within the medical community allows for controlling how 
the issue is framed and preventing any kind of issue expansion (Schattschneider 1975; 
Elder and Cobb 1972, 1983).  
The medical community is not the sole actor interested in the issue of human 
biotechnology and in order to understand the impact of self-regulation we need to analyze 
it within the context of the overall structure of the political conflict surrounding assisted 
reproduction. In a similar vein than the conflict over abortion liberalization, the 
manipulation of human embryo triggers the mobilization of religious actors. Religious 
groups together with religion-based political parties such as Christian Democrats will 
likely seek to that protect “the beginning of life” and therefore advocate restrictive policies 
or perhaps even total bans through strong forms of state intervention eliminating all self-
regulatory mechanism or limiting them severely to minor issues of medical practice 
(Engeli et al. 2012b). Religious actors were clearly the ‘losers’ of the initial mode of self-
regulation entirely left to the professional organizations. Through the strategy of issue 
expansion, religious actors aimed at reframing the issue at stake and challenge the initial 
policy monopoly of the medical community (Baumgartner and Jones 2009: 53ff).  
We argue that cohesion of policy preferences within the medical community 
greatly contributes to their capacity to influence the choice of governance mode for human 
biotechnology. Speaking with one voice may counter the mobilization of religious actors 
and prevent issue expansion. Indeed, preserving the framing of human biotechnology as 
being a primarily health-related question maintains the medical community as the 
principal legitimate stakeholder. In contrast, fragmentation over policy preferences within 
the medical community provides other actors with the opportunity to challenge this 
dominant frame and successfully associate human biotechnology with more general issues, 
such as the abortion conflict (Banchoff 2005; Engeli et al. 2012b) or the negative impact 
of scientific advances on society. Expanding the scope of conflict attracts public attention 
towards how best to govern the field and breaks down the policy monopoly of the medical 
community. In doing so, religious actors may succeed in mobilizing a broader array of 
interests and thus render it more difficult for a fragmented medical community to control 
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problem definition and, accordingly, regulatory policy-making. Our second hypothesis, 
therefore, reads as follows: If there is no consensus over the preferences regarding the 
desirable degree of state intervention within the medical community, systems of 
governance with no or very limited self-governance mechanisms are more likely to be 
developed.  
Drawing on comparative case studies of France, Germany and the UK, our analysis 
shows that comprehensive and well-respected voluntary self-regulation strengthens the 
medical community’s position as expert and its credibility as reliable partners in the 
regulatory process. In addition, the cohesion of policy preferences within the medical 
community prevents the issue-expansion strategy of other actors with competing policy 
preferences, such as religious actors who mobilize against human biotechnology and self-
regulation. 
 
FRANCE: TAKING OVER A SELF-REGULATORY MESS 
The French governance mode for human biotechnology is a classic form of “command and 
control”. During the 1980s, some voluntary self-regulation within the medical community 
was first developed to address medical and ethical issues related to sperm and egg 
donation and was then extended to cover ART techniques themselves. The initial state 
regulation in 1988 only imposed licensing procedures upon assisted reproductive 
technologies medical centers and left the regulation of the field to the medical community. 
Nevertheless, the self-regulatory guidelines were not respected by the whole community 
and an important split emerged among physicians. In addition to the long-standing 
institutional fragmentation of the medical community, divided opinions on how best to 
regulate the field pushed the government to take over its regulation and develop a 
comprehensive legislative framework on human biotechnology.  
The medical community has been very active in the public debate on human 
biotechnology since the diffusion of in vitro fertilization in the early 1980s in France, but 
it failed to speak with a unified voice. The two main professional organizations – the 
National Order of Physicians and the National Academy of Medicine – were very reluctant 
to launch any self-regulatory process on human biotechnology. It were the largest assisted 
reproductive technologies (ART) centers at that time which grouped together into several 
federations and developed comprehensive guidelines to regulate specific aspects of ART 
at first – such as sperm donation firs and then later ART techniques more 
comprehensively.9 Notably, the centers specialized in sperm and later egg donation were 
the first ones to form a federation, the CECOS. If the federations grew rapidly and their 
guidelines were well respected among their respective members, the public craze for ART 
in France resulted into a rapid increase in ART centers and they did not all follow the 
various guidelines. The initial regulation in 1988 introduced a licensing procedure that 
failed to monitor the supply of ART treatment. As a result, ART practices increasingly 
diverged and the field was divided between the different federations and their competitors, 
which opened up ART practice to surrogacy, single motherhood, and the use of a deceased 
husband’s sperm. Divergence in ART practices expanded the public controversy on ART 
more generally and took it out of just the medical community; the situation was criticized 
for promoting confusion.10 This chaotic scenario pushed the government to resume its 
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efforts to substantively take control of the field of human biotechnology. After a long 
process of public consultation and decision-making, the resulting 1994 laws on bioethics 
comprehensively regulated the field and severely constrained ART practices. The human 
embryonic stem cell research breakthrough led the government to revise the laws on 
bioethics and impose a restrictive “command and control” regulation on embryo-related 
research in 2004 and 2011.11 
The impact of voluntary self-regulation on the governance arrangements developed 
in France is relatively weak. On one hand, the CECOS succeeded in imposing its 
regulatory rules on sperm, egg and embryo donation that were almost fully integrated into 
the successive laws, and it did so against the policy preferences of its main medical 
competitors. On the other hand, the French state’s takeover of the regulation of the field 
severely constrained technological development in the area of human biotechnology, in 
particular regarding embryonic stem cell research. The medical community, including the 
CECOS, pleaded in vain for more room for maneuver and greater self-regulation. The 
institutional fragmentation of the medical community, the lack of leadership from the main 
professional organization, together with the competition among the ART practitioners and 
the great differences in policy preferences within the medical community explain to a 
great deal the comprehensive intervention of the French state into the field of human 
biotechnology. The representation of health care professionals has been traditionally 
fragmented in France and has negatively impacted the relationship between health actors 
and the State in several ways (Hassenteufel 1997). Neither the National Academy of 
Medicine nor the National Order of Physicians demonstrated any will to take the 
leadership in establishing voluntary self-regulation that would have exerted a biding effect 
on ART practices. In addition, the National Order of Physicians has been challenged by a 
substantial part of the profession since its creation by the Vichy regime. One of the peaks 
in this struggle occurred during the 1970s with development of alternative medicine. 
Among others, the abortion issue crystallized this growing fractiousness (Engeli 2011). 
While the National Order was strongly opposing the liberalization of abortion, some 
young doctors were openly practicing abortion and publicized their opposition to the NOP. 
Three of the ART pioneers in France were among them and they were later co-founders of 
CECOS. Nonetheless, the reluctance of the national organizations to address the issue of 
ART did not prevent the development of self-regulation. Some of sperm donation centers 
were the first ones to create a federation to protect their interests in 1981. Later in the 
1980s, they were followed by public and private IVF centers, as well as ART laboratories. 
All these organizations developed some rules of conduct, best practices, and reporting 
procedures that were well-respected among their respective members. These various 
attempts at self-regulation were never fully coordinated and the different organizations 
never merged together to speak with one voice. Moreover, the fragmentation of the 
representation of health actors was worsened by the spread of competing ART centers that 
did not respect these self-regulatory rules. The competing centers also expressed divergent 
policy preferences and promoted alternative ART techniques such as surrogacy and post-
mortem sperm donation, which sparked heated controversy in France. The CECOS was 
calling for state intervention into the regulation of the field while other ART actors were 
opposing any form of public intervention into what they considered being an arena of 
private choice. 
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Weakened by its deep fragmentation in terms of representation and policy 
preferences, the medical community failed to prevent the expansion of the scope of 
conflict. The public debate on ART saw the emergence of non-medical actors – such as 
religious organizations and women’s groups- who promoted an alternative framing of the 
ART issue; they questioned the legitimacy of “science for science’s sake” and the social 
and moral implications of ART development. The debate was such that the government 
launched a large scale exercise in deliberative democracy in the early 1990s, seeking to 
engage the public on how best to govern the field, which was highly unusual in the French 
unitary system of government (Meny 2008). The consultation procedure was employed 
again for the revised laws on bioethics in 2004 and 2011. During the consultation and the 
legislative processes over the 1990s and 2000s, the medical actors were represented but 
were only one set of actors among many, and with no privileged place in the process. 
The French case clearly demonstrates how divided policy preferences and the lack 
of comprehensive self-regulation have an impact on the development of the system of 
governance over time. The French government was initially reluctant to intervene in the 
field of human biotechnology. It was nevertheless facing increasing public pressure to 
intervene. Without any consensus among the medical community to rely on, it took over 
regulation entirely. The resulting “command and control” regulatory solution was intended 
to ease public concern about ART, on the one hand, but it was also adopted to substitute 
for the lack of binding self-regulation, on the other hand.  
 
THE UNITED KINGDOM: THE INCREASING POWER DELEGATION OVER TIME  
The governance arrangements for assisted reproduction and embryo-related research in the 
United Kingdom are the most advanced form of delegated self-regulation in the field of 
human biotechnology across Western Europe. The UK system of governance still contains 
some “command and control” features – a number of explicit prohibitions are stated in the 
parliamentary acts governing the field. The delegation of regulatory authority has 
nevertheless constituted a key element of the regime since its initial stage in the early 
1990s and it has been further expanded over time. The UK case shows how a rapid and 
well-respected voluntary self-regulation together with shared policy preferences among 
health professionals allows to contain the ART issue within a medical and science frame, 
which in turn greatly impacts the evolution of the governance arrangements over time. 
The UK has been a leading country in the field of human biotechnology since the 
early stage with the world’s first successful IVF in 1978. The first test-tube baby attracted 
a great amount of attention. Public enthusiasm was nevertheless mitigated with concern 
regarding the consequences of this breakthrough and future technological developments. 
The government quickly considered the ART issue to be a ‘politically hot potato’ and 
mandated a Committee of Inquiry in 1982 to make review the social and ethical 
implications of technological development in the field of human biotechnology and advice 
the government on how best to regulate field (Blank 2004: 123). The Warnock 
Committee’s permissive recommendations drew some strong opposition, notably moral 
objections regarding the absence of any embryo legal status. Under the joint leadership of 
the main professional organizations – the Royal College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists and the Medical Research Council, the medical community followed the 
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Warnock Committee’s recommendations and quickly set up a voluntary licensing 
authority. Under Major first government, this voluntary licensing authority was then 
adopted in the 1990s Human Fertilization and Embryology Act and became the Human 
Fertilization and Embryology Authority (HFEA). While the 1990 Act established a limited 
number of prohibitions, such as the implantation of animal embryo in women, it is best 
characterized by its wide delegation of regulatory power to the HFEA. Indeed, the HFEA 
was granted a broad regulatory autonomy deciding how ART and embryo research was to 
be conducted. In addition to its rule enforcement function, the HFEA has also been 
delegated rule-making power: HFEA has full authority not only to license and monitor 
ART and embryo research but also to regulate practices through its Code of Practice, 
which set binding requirements as well as guidance for ART practices and embryo 
research. Moreover, the legal framework does not impose much of prescription or 
prohibition regarding which ART techniques have to be allowed and what embryo 
research has to be conducted. Through its licensing capacity, the HFEA actually de facto 
decides the direction of ART and research development, as long as the licensing 
applications comply with the parliamentary Acts. This power delegation power has been 
strengthened over time with the 2001 and 2008 revision of the 1990 Act and the 2001 
Human Reproductive Cloning Act. 
While the medical community did not precede the government in developing any 
form of voluntary self-regulation, they had quickly showed their willingness in 
collaborating with the government to develop governance arrangements from its initial 
stage. Indeed, the majority of the Warnock Committee members were science and health 
actors and the medical and research community is still nowadays well-represented within 
the HFEA board. The medical community did not stop at successfully establishing its 
institutional representation. Concerned with potential contestation of the legitimacy to 
interfere into the reproduction process (McLaren 2002), the professional organizations did 
not wait for the passing of any parliamentary Act to establish a voluntary licensing 
authority in charge of reviewing, authorizing and inspecting ART and research activities in 
1985 (Allan 2010).12 The form and scope of this voluntary self-regulatory body closely 
followed the recommendations of the Warnock report. While no sanction was include in 
case of non-compliance, most of the ART and research centers applied for a license and 
respected the guidelines (McLaren 2002; Blank 2004). The development of this voluntary 
authority exerted an important impact on the development and evolution of the UK system 
of governance over time. It demonstrated both the efficacy and efficiency of such 
authority. It provided the government with some evidence of the success of licensing-
based regulatory approach that facilitates science advance while allowing little but key 
scientific gate keeping in the “command and control” features of the governance 
arrangements. As a result, the key features of the HFEA are very similar to the voluntary 
authority ones, and its power authority has been increased over time. 
The broad consensus over how best to regulate the field among the medical 
community did provide the professional organizations with an opportunity to open up the 
actors’ network without risking any issue expansion. To strengthen the transparency of the 
voluntary self-regulation mechanism, the professional organizations opened up this 
regulatory body to lay people. If the first test-tube baby attracted a great amount of 
attention, public enthusiasm was nevertheless mitigated with concern regarding the 
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consequences of this breakthrough and future technological developments. Here as well, 
the professional organizations closely followed the Warnock recommendations and took 
care to counter-balance the over-representation of the medical and research community. 
The self-regulation impacted on the shift in public opinion regarding the ART issue. At the 
time when the 1990 Act was passed, public support for ART and embryo research took 
over the skepticism and fears of the early 1980s. As a member of the Warnock committee 
puts it (McLaren 2002: p. 427), the voluntary self-regulation provided “(…) very valuable 
reassurance to the public that there weren’t nasty scientists doing witched things behind 
closed doors”. The social and political legitimacy of self-regulatory mechanism in the UK 
was confirmed with the 2001 revision of the 1990 Act which allows for embryonic stem 
cell research and the creation of embryos for research purpose. 
 
GERMANY: COMBINING EMBRYO-PROTECTION WITH SELF-REGULATION 
The system of governance for assisted reproduction in Germany combines self-regulatory 
governance with federal legislation, and can be interpreted as a governance mode with 
partial delegation (Rothmayr and Ramjoué 2004, Abels and Rothmayr 2007, and 
Rothmayr 2006). As our analysis shows, the Bundesärtzekammer, the German Medical 
Association, has a strong tradition and institutionally recognized capacity of self-
regulation. In a political context, where assisted reproduction is highly politicized because 
of the abortion debates in the past and the experience of World War II, their self-
regulatory capacity is crucial to understand the resulting governance arrangements. 
Since the 1980s the German Medical Association has been very present in the 
public debate on assisted reproduction and the discussions among its members. Since 1985 
the professional code (Berufsordnung) of the German Medical Association regulates 
assisted reproduction in Germany (Bundesärtzekammer 1985, 1988, 1998, 2006). The 
German Medical Association elaborates a model professional code (Muster-
Berufsordnung) which is then adopted by the Länder Medical Chambers. The professional 
code is binding law on the Länder level and can be enforced in court. Their self-regulation 
preceded federal legislation. The Embryo Protection Act (Embryonenschutzgesetz), 
adopted in 1990 under a coalition government of Christian-Democrats (CDU/CSU) and 
Liberals (FDP), focuses on protecting the embryo from possible harm by the new 
technology. In 2002 and then in 2011 two important legislative changes occurred: first, 
under a Social-Democratic government, the Bundestag decided to allow for the research 
on imported stem cell lines (Stammzellgesetz, StZG), and second, under coalition 
government of Christian-Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Liberals (FDP) to allow for pre-
implantation genetic diagnostics on a case to case basis (Präimplantationsdiagnostikgesetz 
– PräimpG)13. Around all three decisions, there was strong mobilization and a broad public 
debate, and accordingly, the medical association was just one voice among others.   
The German legislation strongly focuses on embryo protection and, in contrast to 
other countries, does not propose a comprehensive legislation on all aspects of assisted 
reproduction. The framing of assisted reproduction in terms of embryo protection is the 
result of several components: In 1975 the Federal Constitutional Court declared the 
abortion law to be unconstitutional and stated that the constitutional protection of human 
dignity (Art. 1 GG) and the right to life (Recht auf Leben, Art. 2 GG) apply to the embryo 
 16 
after implantation and the State accordingly recognized the obligation to protect the 
embryo. This jurisprudence on the protection of the embryo strongly contributed to 
framing ART in terms of embryo protection. Evidently, the fact that the Christian-
Democrats were in power, and the broad mobilization of religious interest groups and the 
Churches (Landeskirchen) are crucial in order to understand this very specific focus of the 
debate. However, the comprehensiveness of their early voluntary self-regulation and their 
strong enforcement capacity due to the legally binding character of the professional code 
equally contribute to explaining the absence of a more comprehensive federal legislation 
for assisted reproduction.  
Through the fact that the Länder Medical Chambers are public law bodies and the 
professional code is legally binding, medical self-governance is explicitly delegated to the 
medical community and what constitutes on the first glance voluntary self-regulation has a 
binding legal status. From the beginning of the agenda-setting process, the German 
Medical Association proofed to be a reliable partner, setting national, well respected 
standards for a broad range of assisted reproductive technologies and related ethical issues. 
The professional code imposed limits, guided doctors in their therapeutic choices, assured 
patients of quality and guaranteed them the necessary counseling. Even if the medical 
profession would have preferred a more comprehensive legislation, there was already a 
functioning self-regulatory regime in place anchored in the strong German neo-corporatist 
tradition. The self-governance is certainly not the cause of the focus on embryo-protection, 
but it reduced the scope of conflict, and rendered a multi-faceted, very divisive issue 
tractable: why bother about additional, potentially equally divisive issues, if the medical 
profession proofed willing and capable of finding a consensus, adopt meaningful 
guidelines and enforced them?14  
It has now been 22 years since the Embryo protection law has been adopted, and 
there would have been ample time to adopt a more comprehensive legislation, but this has 
not happened. Additional legislation on stem-cell research and pre-implantation 
diagnostics have been adopted in order to take into account more recent developments. As 
the stem-cell research and the preimplantation genetic diagnostics debate revealed, putting 
assisted reproduction on the agenda is very costly in Germany and divides political parties 
internally, to the extent that in both cases there was a free vote in the Bundestag where 
MPs had not to follow a party line in order to render the intractable problem governable 
and assure the strong presence of the state in regulating human biotechnology. 
Nevertheless, while the state strongly intervenes, he continues to rely on self-governance 
mechanism for various issues that in other countries, such as France, Switzerland, Austria 
or Italy are solely regulated through governmental legislation.   
 
CONCLUSION 
The comparative case studies of the development and evolution of the system of 
governance for human biotechnology in France, the UK and Germany has revealed that 
the state has progressively played a more pivotal role in the field over time. From being an 
external and passive observer of initial self-governance arrangements, the state has 
progressively become a primary player in governing the human biotechnology field and its 
responsibility and steering capacity has strengthened over time. In the three countries, 
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government has become a pivotal actor in developing governance arrangements over time 
and is key to any of the hybrid governance arrangements that have been articulated to 
govern human biotechnology. In this respect, the three cases follow the general pattern of 
stronger state intervention over time that we can observe in Western-Europe, which meant 
in some cases overcoming initial limits to the state’s capacity of coordinating political and 
societal actors (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002) for a novel, highly divisive issue. 
If government’s primary role in governing the field is a constant in our case 
studies, the contrast between the systems of governance that have been developed points 
out that the way in which government exerts its steering role is in turn mediated by self-
governance mechanisms established by private actors. Professional self-regulation matters 
in the development of governance modes for intractable policy problems such as human 
biotechnology. In fact, medical associations mobilized their prior general -- not human 
biotechnology specific -- self-regulatory capacity with various degrees of success. 
Comprehensive and well-respected voluntary self-regulation strengthens the medical 
community’s position as expert and its credibility as a reliable partner in the regulatory 
process. As the UK case demonstrates, the mobilization of the medical community under 
the leadership of the main professional organizations provided the government with strong 
evidence of the efficacy and efficiency of self-regulatory mechanisms. In addition, the 
broad policy consensus within the medical community allowed for opening up the policy 
network without risking any issue expansion. The professional organizations took great 
care to integrate lay people into self-regulatory bodies and provided the general public 
with high levels of information on technological development and possibilities for future 
treatments. On the contrary, faced with severe public concern about the implications of 
human biotechnology development, the French government was left with a chaotic self-
regulatory situation and competing ART stakeholders. The UK government could rely on 
professional self-regulation while the French government took over the regulation of the 
field entirely. The German case presents some mixed evidence. The professional 
community was well-organized and developed comprehensive self-regulation. They failed, 
however, to impose a fully delegated regulatory regime and had to contend with strong 
opposition, notably from religious actors. Professional self-regulation nevertheless 
prevented a total ban on ART that was promoted by the latter. It has reduced the scope of 
the controversy and contributed to reaching a policy compromise, despite the high level of 
political conflict over how best to regulate the human biotechnology field.  
In short, the comparison of the three cases reveals that the ability of private actors 
to influence governance modes depends only partly on their organizational capacity in the 
strict sense. Rather whether and to what extent they succeed in influencing how a novel 
problem is structured and framed turns out to be crucial. Nevertheless, their success in 
shaping a novel problem through self-regulatory processes and hence successfully limiting 
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